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I. INTRODUCTION

Benjamin Franklin once famously remarked: "in this world nothing
can said to be certain, except death and taxes."' The United States is no
exception. Thanks to a tax statute that has been re-codified four times
and amended dozens more it is hard for Americans to foresee exactly
what taxes they will pay. Still, even in paying under a mercurial tax
code, Americans can count on another certainty, the mortgage interest
deduction. 2
Deeply ingrained in the law and the American
consciousness, the nation understands that the government has set out to
reward its citizens for the good behavior of homeownership with this
special tax break. 3 The mortgage interest deduction is so well ensconced
in the Internal Revenue Code that it is often considered the immutable
third rail of the tax code. 4 Tax mythology says it has been around since
the beginning of the income tax, and every indication is that it will stick
around until the end. 5 In commenting on its endurance, Representative
Barney Frank recently quipped, "the sun will go away before it does." 6
The mortgage interest deduction is here to stay. It is as American as
clich6s about baseball and apple pie.
The mortgage interest deduction may be an essential part of
American taxation heritage, but in its present form it is not a single,
easily quotable rule in the tax code. It is more of an exception to an
exception to a rule, and its complexity prohibits a direct recitation.7
However, the common understanding of the mortgage interest deduction
1.

Benjamin Franklin, Letter to Jean Baptiste Le Roy [Nov. 13, 1789], in 10 THE WRITINGS

OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, 1789-1790, 69 (Albert Henry Smyth ed. 1907).
2. See Roger Lowenstein, Who Needs the Mortgage-InterestDeduction?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.

5, 2006, at 79. Lowenstein provides an excellent summary of this mythology surrounding the
mortgage interest deduction.
3. See id.
4. See Bruce Bartlett, Tax Reform 's "Third Rail": Mortgage Interest, 139 NCPR POL'Y
BACKGROUNDER 1, 1 (1996).
5. Lowenstein, supra note 2, at 79.
6.
(Mar.

31,

Jon Prior, Barney Frank says Mortgage Interest Deduction is Safe, HOUSINGWIRE.COM
2001, 11:59 AM), http://www.housingwire.com/news/bamey-frank-says-mortgage-

interest-tax-deduction-safe.
7. For those willing to brave the I.R.C in search of the mortgage interest deduction, it can be
found as follows: I.R.C § 163(a) states: "[tihere shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or
accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness." I.R.C. § 163 (West 2013). An exception to this
rule is made under I.R.C § 163(h), which states that the general rule of I.R.C § 163(a) shall not
apply to individuals. Id. To this exception, another smaller exception is carved out in I.R.C §§
163(h)(2)(D) and (h)(3) that allows the I.R.C 163(a) deduction to apply to "qualified residence
interest," which is includes mortgages and home equity loans up to a certain amount. Id.
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is generally correct and rather easy to summarize. 8 Broadly speaking,
American homeowners may deduct from their taxable income an amount
equal to the interest they paid during the tax year on any loan which is
secured by their first or second residence, up to a ceiling amount on the
loan. 9 The mortgage interest deduction covers both interest paid on
primary mortgages-loans used to purchase the residence, and second
mortgages, also known as home equity loans-loans with proceeds that
can be applied to any purpose.'o
The mortgage interest deduction is generally defended as a tax
incentive to encourage homeownership."l More than some fanciful ideal
of the American Dream, ownership of single family residential dwellings
has been tied to legion social and economic benefits. 12 Homeowners are
more likely to have strong marriages that are less interrupted by legal
13
separations and higher senses of self-worth and well-being.
Homeowners' children are more likely to finish high school and less
likely to be arrested or have a teenage pregnancy. 14 One study
concludes that homeowners are generally more civically-minded
citizens, more politically involved, more likely to attend church, and
more likely to invest in local communal infrastructure such as public
gardens. 15 With such myriad benefits, Congress certainly has an interest
in encouraging homeownership through whatever means available,
including the tax code.
Despite the multitude of benefits homeownership has for
individuals, the mortgage interest deduction does not seem to work
8.

See Peter Brady et al., Regional Differences in the Utilization of the Mortgage Interest

Deduction,

OFFICE

OF

TAX

ANALYSIS

PAPER

88

(2001),

available

http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/ota88.pdf.
provides a reasonable summary of the mortgage interest deduction.
9. Id.
10.

at

This paper

Id.

11. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Devicefor Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures,83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 706-711 (1970). For
clarity's sake, this article adopts Professor Surrey's definition of a tax incentive as a "tax
expenditure which induces certain activities or behavior in response to the monetary benefit
available." Id. at 711.
12. See generally Anthony DePalma, Why Owning a Home is the American Dream, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1988, at 5. See also Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgagingthe American Dream: A
CriticalEvaluation of the FederalGovernment's Promotion of Home Equity Financing,69 TUL. L.
REV. 373, 394 (1994).
13. Peter H. Rossi & Eleanor Weber, The Social Benefits of Homeownership: Empirical
Evidencefrom NationalSurveys, 7 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 1, 11-16 (1996).
14. Richard K. Green & Michelle J. White, Measuringthe Benefits of Homeowning: Effects
on Children, 41 J. URB. ECON., 441,452 (1997).
15. Denise DiPasquale & Edward Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners
Better Citizens?, 45 J. URB. ECON., 354, 356 (1999).
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toward this purpose. Numerous studies in government, academics,
economics, and law have concluded that the mortgage interest deduction
has little impact on homeownership.' 6 For instance, Gale, Gruber, and
Stephens-Davidowitz argue, "[b]oth theoretical considerations and
empirical evidence suggest that the [mortgage interest deduction] has
little if any positive effect on homeownership."' 17 Similarly, in 2005 the
President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform found "[a]lthough
the deduction for home mortgage interest is often justified on the
grounds that it is necessary for promoting home ownership, it is unclear
to what extent rates of home ownership depend on the subsidy."' 8 The
Panel further concluded "[t]he tax preferences that favor housing exceed
what is necessary to encourage home ownership or help more Americans
buy their first home."' 9 Recently Hilber and Turner analyzed the
mortgage interest deduction's effect on homeownership and housing
supply in eighty-three metropolitan areas in the United States. 20 In
doing so, they concluded that the mortgage interest deduction has "no
discernible impact in aggregate on U.S. homeownership outcomes," but
moreover that "rather than boosting homeownership attainment, much of
the [mortgage interest deduction] is capitalized into housing prices. 21
Encouraging homeownership may be a worthwhile policy, but the
mortgage interest deduction is at best an ineffective tool for
accomplishing it.
So if the mortgage interest deduction does not increase
homeownership rates, what does it do?An interesting first step toward
answering this question is to step back and observe that while the
mortgage interest deduction is intended as a tax incentive for increasing
consumption of owner-occupied housing, it is actually an incentive
located entirely within another market, the mortgage market. The
housing market and mortgage market are closely related, yet they are
still distinct. Generally lost in the discussions of the mortgage interest
deduction's effects on the housing market is a clear analysis of how the

16. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR,
AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO Fix AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 72 (2005) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL]; William G. Gale, Jonathan Gruber & Seth Stephens-Davidowitz,
Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 TAX NOTES 1171, 1179 (2007).
Gale, Gruber & Stephens-Davidowitz, supra note 16, at 1179.
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 16, at 72.
19. Id.
at71.
20. Christian A. L. Hilber & Tracy M. Turner, The Mortgage Interest Deduction and its
Impact on Homeownership Decisions, REV. ECON. & STAT. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1),
available at http://personal.Ise.ac.uk/hilber.
21. Id.
at2.
17.
18.
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deduction has affected the American mortgage market. On some level,
the absence of this discussion is understandable. It may be hard to
assess how the mortgage interest deduction has affected the American
mortgage market because, in a very real sense, the deduction and the
market grew up together, inextricably intertwined throughout the second
half of the twentieth century. But while the impact of the deduction may
be difficult to observe on its own abstractly, it may be possible to
observe the effects of a major alteration of the law. The Tax Reform Act
of 198622 redefined the interest deduction by cutting off access to the
deduction from a massive population of taxpayers and promising its
continuance into the future for others. This Act refined and entrenched
the mortgage interest deduction, and in doing so may have altered
American mortgage consumption patterns.23 Observing how these
changes to the interest deduction coincide with shifts in the mortgage
market may provide a better understanding of how the deduction affects
the mortgage market.
This article will work to answer the question: What effect has the
mortgage interest deduction had on the American mortgage market?
The main examination proceeds in two ways. First, this article recounts
the interrelated histories of the American mortgage market and the
deduction of interest from taxable income throughout the twentieth
century, giving special attention to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the
events that led to the codification of the current mortgage interest
deduction. Second, this article analyzes several sets of time series data
and numerous pieces of qualitative evidence on mortgage consumption
in and around the 1980s to determine if, and to what extent, the changes
to the mortgage interest deduction has had an economic impact on the
American mortgage market. Though it is impossible to prove single
causation when analyzing a market as complex as the residential
mortgage market in the United States, the analysis shows that the
purposeful refinement and entrenchment of the interest deduction in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 correlated with an appreciable shift in the
mortgage market in favor of consuming more mortgages and
maintaining higher mortgage debt levels.
This article concludes with observations about the relationship
between the mortgage interest deduction and the American mortgage
market. The conclusion of this article will discuss possible reasons why
the mortgage interest deduction may increase mortgage debt

22.
23.

Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat 2085 (1986).
See id.
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consumption, yet may not increase homeownership rates. Furthermore,
the conclusion will also touch upon the timely question of whether the
mortgage interest deduction caused the American mortgage bubble,
which collapsed with disastrous effects in 2008.

II. THE EARLY INTEREST DEDUCTION, 1913-1986
The present form of the mortgage interest deduction first appeared
with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, but this was not the first time
24
homeowners could deduct mortgage interest from their taxable income.
To understand the importance of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the
creation of the modem mortgage deduction to the American mortgage
market, it is important to understand the underlying history of the
original interest deduction, its purpose, and the way markets have
responded to it throughout the twentieth century. Stated very briefly, the
history of this interest deduction is that of an overly broad tax provision
that failed to evolve with America's changing economy, three distinct
groups that took advantage of the deduction at different points, and the
reckoning of the deduction with these groups through the Tax Reform
Act of 1986. This section will consider each of these elements in turn.
A.

The Overly Broad Deduction: The Revenue Act of 1913

In 1913, the United States ratified the Sixteenth Amendment,
putting to rest more than a century of controversy over the
constitutionality of federal tax efforts. 25 The Sixteenth Amendment
authorized Congress "to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived
,26 Congress quickly acted on its new authority by
passing the Revenue Act of 1913, which imposed the first permanent
federal income tax.27 This income tax, which applied only to businesses
and the wealthiest Americans, imposed a tax on "the entire net income
arising or accruing from all sources in the preceding calendar year...,,2 8
Importantly, the critical word "income" was not-and to this day still is
not-defined in the federal tax laws. 29 Despite the lack of a statutory
24. See Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114, sec. 11,para. B (1913).
25. See, e.g., Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S.
586 (1880); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Brushaber v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co. 240 U.S. I (1916).
26. U.S. Const. amend. XVI.
27. Revenue Act of 1913, supra note 24.
28. Id.
29. Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Federal Income Tax, 29 POL. SCI. Q. I, 3-4 (1914); C.
HARRY KAHN, PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1-2 (1960).
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definition, Congress and the courts mutually developed jurisprudence
that the income tax was not a gross receipts tax and would not seek a
levy against every dollar that came in a taxpayer's door. In 1918 the
Supreme Court observed:
Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise and scientific
definition of 'income,' it imports, as used here, something entirely
distinct from principal or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a
measure of the tax; conveying rather the idea of gain or increase
arising from corporate activities. ...

'Income may be defined30 as the

gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.'

Under this jurisprudence, the tax is on profit, gain, or generally the
positive product of the taxpayer's labor and investments. 3' The Supreme
Court has described this aspect of income as "[an] undeniable
accession[] to wealth,, 32 but economists simply call it the taxpayer's
portion of economic growth.3 3 In any case, Congress manifested its
intent to tax only economic gain by incorporating a series of deductions
in the Revenue Act of 1913 with a lodestar that expenses incurred in the
course of earning profit should be deductible from income. 3 4 The
Revenue Act of 1913 lists eight specific deductions generally designed
to allow profit makers to exclude their business expenses, deduct their
losses, and avoid double taxation. 35 Included in this list is a deduction
for "all interest paid within the year by a taxable person on
indebtedness. 36
Commentators observed that several of these
deductions, including the deduction for interest paid on indebtedness,
were written so broadly that individuals could use them to deduct
personal expenses in addition to business expenses. 37 Indeed, in the case
of the deduction for interest on indebtedness, though Congress's purpose
was to allow businesses to deduct interest on business debt, there is not
even an allusion to restricting this deduction to business debt in the

30. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918) (quoting in part from Stratton
Indep. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913)); see also Clark v. United States, 211 F.2d 100, 102
(1954).
31. Doyle, 247 U.S. at 185 (quoting in part from Stratton, 231 U.S. at 415).
32. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
33. See generally, Nicholas Crafts, Economic Growth, in THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECON. HISTORY, 137-145 (2003).
34. See Stanley S. Surrey, The FederalIncome Tax Basefor Individuals, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
815, 824-25 (1958); see also Joseph A. Pechman, Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, 10 NAT'L
TAXJ. 1, 6 (1957).
35. Revenue Act of 1913, supra note 24, at sec. II, para. B.
36. Id.
37. KAHN, supra note 29, at 4.
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text.38
Why would Congress write these deductions so broadly that they
could be used for unintended purposes? 39 Some commentators observe
that the Revenue Act of 1913 simply "was not clear on many points" and
it lacked the abounding detail and precision of modem tax laws. 40 This
imprecision may have been a natural consequence of the fact that the
government had "not yet developed adequate assessment machinery"
necessary to review, assess, and audit millions of complex tax returns,
and was therefore only prepared to process a very simple income tax.4'
The deductions' over-breadth may have been a consequence of this
necessary imprecision or simplicity. Other commentators attribute the
breadth of these deductions to the difficulty in separating personal
expenses from business expenses at that time. As Professor Kahn
observes, the best explanation for broad deductions "is simply the lack
of distinction between personal expenses on the one hand and business
expenses and losses on the other, which appears to have been of
significance in drawing up the first income tax laws." 42 Professor
Koppelman applies this reasoning to the interest deduction, saying "[t]he
deductibility of personal interest may have been less a matter of
principle than a reflection of the practical difficulty of distinguishing
personal from profit-seeking interest.1 43 Whatever the cause, the general
interest deduction found in the Revenue Act of 1913 clearly was broad
beyond its purpose and had the potential to include groups that were not
intended.
As a point of some irony, in addition to being overly broad, the
general interest deduction was also superfluous to its purpose. Any
business seeking to use the interest deduction could have just as easily
deducted its interest payments under the general deduction for "the
necessary expenses actually paid in carrying on any business" that was
also created in 1913. 44 As the Tax Court confirmed in 1962:
To the extent that interest paid on indebtedness also meets the test of [a
business] expense, the two [deductions] may be said to 'overlap' and
the interest may be deducted under either one of the two sections just
38.
Eric TODER ET AL., REFORMING THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 1 (2010);
Michael Asimow, The Interest Deduction, 24 UCLA L. REV. 749, 749 (1976).

39.

Asimow, supra note 38, at 749-50.

40. DAVIS RICH DEWEY, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 491 (11 th ed. 1931).
41.
Roy G. Blakely, The New Income Tax, 4 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 38 (1914).
42.
KAHN, supra note 29, at 12-13.
43.
Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L.
REV. 679, 713 (1987).
44. Revenue Act of 1913, supra note 24, at sec. I, para. B.
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so long as it is not deducted under both. From a pure deduction
standpoint it would make no difference in tax liability45 whether the
interest deduction was claimed under [either deduction].
However, as the jurisprudence surrounding this point was not fully
developed until 1962, the existence of a specific interest deduction
provision may have seemed necessary in the early days of the income
tax.
B.

The Intended Group: Business InterestDeductions, 1913-1945

Despite being overly broad and generally superfluous, in its early
years, the interest deduction worked as intended, primarily benefitting
businesses holding debt. At the time of enactment, businesses were
already encumbered by tremendous debt obligations. For instance, by
1913 the American railroad industry was carrying collective, funded
debt in the mammoth amount of $11.2 billion.46 Moreover, businesses
were continuing to acquire evermore debt by new and innovative
instruments such as commercial credit bills and finance bills.4 7 At the
start of the twentieth century, equity markets were still relatively
unsophisticated and debt issues were by far the more common way to
fund large scale business enterprise. As Baskin and Miranti observe,
"debt issues were necessary in order to attract funds from distant
investors with little knowledge of the business because asymmetric
information impeded public markets in equity securities.'
In the first
decades of the twentieth century, debt was the lifeblood of large business
endeavors that needed massive capitalization up front, like railroads and
manufacturing. 49 This debt was incurred in the course of seeking a
profit, its interest was a necessary business expense, and deduction of
this interest was prudent and appropriate under nearly every theory of
income taxation. 50 The interest deduction served an appropriate purpose
for businesses that employed it.
While businesses were taking great advantage of the interest
deduction during that time, average Americans were not. Two factors
were important. First, the individual income tax was a class tax paid by
45.

McNutt-Boyce Co. v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 462, 465-66 (1962); see also Ungerman v.

Comm'r, 89 T.C. 1131, 1136(1987).
46. WILLIAM ZEBINA RIPLEY, RAILROADS: FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION 139(1915).
47. 2 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 25-26 (2002).
48. JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 151 (1997).

49.
50.

Id. at 145-51.
Id.
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only the wealthiest Americans. 51 The income tax originally allowed

initial exemptions of $3,000 for an unmarried individual and $4,000 for
a married couple. 52 This high exemption was more than enough to
ensure that the average American, with an annual income closer to
$1,500 per year, would not have an income tax burden.53 The exemption
fluctuated in the decades following enactment, going down to broaden
the base and increase revenue during World War I;54 and going back up
again with lower tax rates to relieve the nation's tax burden in the
1920s. 55 In the 1930s, the exemption again went down and tax rates
went up to fund the New Deal.56 As the incomes across the country
were devastated by the Depression, however, these higher taxes raised
almost no money from the average American. 57 Thus, even though
fluctuating, the exemption remained high enough to keep the tax burden
on the wealthy and shield the common man from all but the lightest of
income taxes.
Indeed, the United States would not have a truly
widespread income tax until the start of World War 11.58
As a second point, while the amount of consumer debt was
generally trending upward during the 1910s and 1920s, 59 such personal
debts "were minimal" when compared with business debt and not
prevalent enough to make major use of the interest deduction.60
51. Blakely, supra note 41, at 35 (observing, "As compared with other countries, then, it is
evident that our $3,000 [exemption] is high. It is most frequently criticized as being so high as to
make the tax, in effect, a class tax upon the rich, which can be voted by the poor, and a sectional tax
upon the East and Northeast, which is voted by the West and Southwest. There is much truth in
these criticisms and a survey of the states and congressmen ranged on the different sides of the
amendment and of the new law confirms this statement").
52. Revenue Act of 1913, supra note 24, at sec. II, para. C.
53. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT NO. 991,100 YEARS OF U.S. CONSUMER
SPENDING 9 (2006).

54. War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-63, 40 Stat. 300, 301 (1917) (lowering the
initial exemption from $3,000 for a single taxpayer and $4,000 for married couples to $1,000 and
$2,000, respectively).
55. See e.g., Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, 42 Stat. 227, 243; Revenue Act of
1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, 43 Stat. 253, 272; Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-27, 44 Stat. 9,
29.
56. See e.g., Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-209, 47 Stat 169, 174-77, 184; Revenue
Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-277, 48 Stat. 680, 684-86; Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-829,
49 Stat. 1014. 1014-16.
57. MARKHAM, supra note 47, at 201.
58. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 8-9 (5th Ed. 2005); MARGARET MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED

STATES 346 (1970).
59. Lendol Calder, The Evolution of Consumer Credit in the United States, in THE IMPACT
OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT 23, 24-27 (Thomas A. Durkin & Michael Staten eds.,
2002); see also MARKHAM, supra note 47, at 22-23.

60.

Harvey S. Rosen, Housing Subsidies: Effects on Housing Decisions, Efficiency, and

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol28/iss1/2

10

Frederick: Reconciling Intentions with Outcomes: A Critical Examination of t

2013]

RECONCILING INTENTIONS WITH OUTCOMES

Residential mortgages, though likewise trending upward, were
especially in the minority. In 1910, only 38.4% of American non-farm
dwellings were owner-occupied, 61 and of those properties only 33.3%
were encumbered by a mortgage. 62 By 1920, 40.9% were owneroccupied and 39.8% had a mortgage. 63 This means that from 1910 to
1920, only between 12.79% and 16.28% of all non-farm dwellings in the
United States were both occupied by their owners and encumbered by a
mortgage. 64 Any increases in mortgage lending and homeownership in
the 1920s were more than wiped out by the unemployment, lost property
values, bank failures, defaults, and residential foreclosures of the
1930s. 65 Efforts by the federal government to rescue and stabilize the
mortgage finance market laid the groundwork for some financial
infrastructure that would become important to the market later in the
twentieth century, but generally failed to cure the market's ills in the
1930s. 66 By the time the United States entered World War II in
December 1941, dwellings that were both owner occupied and
67
mortgaged were still an insubstantial portion of the housing inventory.
In the first decades of the income tax, the interest deduction was
primarily a tool for businesses. Any individual using the deduction was
likely very wealthy, and his personal finances were probably
inextricably interlinked with his business finances. 68 It was not a device
designed to encourage homeownership among average Americans.
Indeed, before World War II, the average American had no income tax
liability, had no mortgage, and therefore had no need to take notice of
the interest deduction.

Equity, in I HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 375, 388 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein
eds., 1985).
61. This number does not consider vacant dwellings. If vacant housing were included, the
numbers would be even lower.
62. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL
TIMES To 1970 646-48 (1975).
63. Id.
64. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005
605, 618 (2006). In 2003, for the sake of contrast, 68.26% of dwellings were owner-occupied, of
those properties 62.97% were encumbered by a mortgage, making a total of 42.98% of all American
housing units owner occupied and under a mortgage.
65. Michael J. Lea, Innovation and the Cost of Mortgage Credit:A HistoricalPerspective,7
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 147, 159 (1996).

66. See Evolution Of The U.S. Housing FinanceSystem, DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV.,
5 (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/USevolution.pdf.
67. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 62, at 646-48.
68. See Surrey, supra note 34, at 825; see also Koppelman, supra note 43, at 713.
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The Happy Accident: Mortgage Interest Deductions, 1945-1970

In addition to its countless other effects on the course of human
history, World War II fundamentally altered the nature of the interest
deduction in the federal tax code. Two elements are central in
understanding this transformation.
First, World War II changed the federal income tax system from a
narrow tax on the wealthy to a broad tax that reached every American.69
Even before it officially entered the war, the United States shipped
supplies to Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China under the
Lend-Lease Act. 70 Throughout the war the United States continued to
supply the Allies with arms, munitions, and provisions, as well as
mobilized its own army and navy, all at tremendous expense. 7' In 1945,
Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, estimated that the
American war effort cost the country a total of $325 billion, roughly half
of the total GDP for each year of the conflict. 72 After the war ended, the
United States would continue making massive outlays to aid in the
reconstruction of Europe and Japan. 7
To pay for this massive war effort, the federal government turned to
raising taxes on the once again prosperous and growing incomes of
Americans. In each year from 1940 to 1944, Congress passed increases
to the individual and corporate income taxes, as well as new measures to
ensure adequate and timely collection.74 While these tax increases
raised the rates on the wealthy, even putting the top marginal rate at 94%
of income, they were not simply increasing burdens on the upper class.
Rather, by lowering initial exemptions, Congress also broadened the
base of the income tax so that more and more Americans would pay.75
As Professor Carolyn Jones observes, "[these laws] signaled a
fundamental reconfiguration of the income tax from a class tax to a mass
tax.... A tax intended at least symbolically to soak-the-rich during the

69. See Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propagandain the Expansion
of the Income Tax During World War 11,37 BUFF. L. REv. 685, 699 (Fall 1988/1989).

70.
71.
1997).

MYERS, supra note 58, at 343-44.
STEPHEN AMBROSE, THE NEW HISTORY OF WORLD WAR 11114-15, 118-119 (Revised ed.

72.
73.

MYERS, supra note 58, at 343-44.
MARKHAM, supra note 47, at 276.

74.

See Revenue Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-656, 54 Stat. 516; Revenue Act of 1941, Pub.

L. No. 77-250, 55 Stat. 687; Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798; Revenue Act
of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-235, 58 Stat. 21; Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-315,
58 Stat. 231.
75. See THE TAX FOUNDATION, FACTS AND FIGURES ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE 116 (38th

ed. 2005).
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Depression became a feature of everyday life for most Americans. It
was an incredible transformation. 7 6 This incredible transformation
increased the tax base by more than a factor of ten.77 In 1939, there
were 3.9 million taxable income tax returns; in 1945 there were 42.7
million as the income tax broadened its base to reach the majority of
Americans. 8
Moreover, this incredible transformation was permanent. In 1945,
Congress passed a small tax reduction which lowered the top marginal
rate of the income tax from 94% to 86.45% and repealed an excess profit
tax. 79 But there was no indication that the income tax would return to its
pre-war level. The Revenue Act of 1945 maintained the 1944 level of
personal exemption at $500 per person, not nearly high enough to
protect the average American from the income tax. 80 Professor Jones
notes, "[t]he income tax, by contrast, never returned to its 'class tax'
character. It retained its wartime nature as a mass tax and as a
substantial component of federal revenue receipts. 8 1 Subsequent tax
law changes would alter the rates, exemptions, deductions, and methods
of collection, but would never again shield the average American from
paying. 82
The second element of the transformation was the rise of
homeownership and residential mortgages in America. Following the
war, American soldiers poured back into the United States from Europe
and the Pacific. 83 The government welcomed the troops home with the
Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, better known as the G.I. Bill. 84
Among the many provisions of this monumental legislation designed to
help returning soldiers re-acclimate to American life was the Veterans
Administration mortgage insurance program, which offered a federal
guaranty to any residential mortgage taken by a veteran up to a cap of

76.

Jones, supra note 69, at 699.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
62, at 1110.
78. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
62, at 1110; see also Scott Hollenbeck & Maureen Keenan Kahr, Ninety Years ofIndividual Income
and Tax Statistics,1916-2005, in IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 139 (Winter 2008),
available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/16-05intax.pdf.

77.

79.
80.

Revenue Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-214, 59 Stat. 556.
Revenue Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-214, 59 Stat. 556.

81.
82.

Jones, supra note 69, at 687.
Id.
83. See SUZANNE METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS: THE G.I. BILL AND THE MAKING OF THE
GREATEST GENERATION 15-16 (2005).

84.

Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284m et seq.
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$4,000 or 50% of the mortgage value. Veterans used this program en
masse to buy new homes. 86 But the G.I. Bill was just one policy
amongst many that the Federal Government had implemented starting in
the 1930s to stabilize and encourage growth in the U.S. housing market.
For millions of Americans, the benefits of the G.I. Bill combined with
support from agencies and programs, such as the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA, 1934), the Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae, 1938), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC,
1933), and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC,
1934) to create a government supported homeownership renaissance in
the United States from 1945 to 1970.87 This homeownership renaissance
was marked first by a dramatic increase in homeownership rates after
1945, demonstrated in Figure 1:
Owner-Occupied Dwellings as a Percent of
Figure 1: Non-Farm,
88
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This increase in homeownership rates is especially impressive
considering that it coincided with a boom in new housing construction
which greatly increased the housing inventory. From 1941 to 1945,
there was an average of 344,000 new homes added to the housing
inventory each year; from 1946 to 1950, this number increased to an
average of 1.4 million new homes each year; and from 1951 to 1955,

85.
86.
87.

Id. at § 500.
See Green & White, supra note 14, at 96-97.
See MARKHAM, supra note 47, at 304-05; see also Ernest M. Fisher, Changing

InstitutionalPatternsof Mortgage Lending, 5 J. OF FIN. 307, 313 (1950).
88. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note

62, at 646.
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there were on average 1.53 million new homes each year.8 9 Indeed, it
seemed that the supply of new homes could hardly keep up with demand
for owner occupied housing as the United States 9transformed
from a
0
country of "urban renters to suburban homeowners."
The homeownership renaissance also saw a stunning increase in the
use of mortgages to finance home purchases. Throughout the 1950s and
60s, of the increasingly owner occupied homes in the country, the
proportion that were encumbered by a mortgage was also increasing
dramatically. Figure 2 demonstrates this increase in the residential
mortgage proportion:
Figure 2: Percent of Non-Farm,
Owner Occupied Dwellings
9
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BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note

62, at 639.
90. Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical and
Economic Context, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 97 (2005).
91. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
62, at 651.
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While mortgages became more common, the total amount of
residential mortgage debt increased rapidly.9 2 In 1945 there was $25
in
billion in outstanding mortgage debt, in 1950 there was $55 billion,
93
1960 there was $162 billion, and in 1970 there was $338 billion.
In sum, in the post-war era the average American had two
obligations he never had before: an income tax liability and a mortgage
on his new home. As these two obligations combined, Americans
quickly discovered that their mortgage interest was deductible under the
interest deduction. 94 Millions of mortgage holders started taking
advantage of this old tax provision in an aggressive new way. 95 The
interest deduction was still achieving its original purpose as businesses
96
continued deducting interest incurred in the course of profit seeking.
But as scores of homeowners deducted their mortgage interest every
year, the general interest deduction took on a new life and grew beyond
97
its original purpose into a residential mortgage interest deduction.
Congress looked on this expansion with tacit approval and made no
effort to repeal or alter the deduction. Indeed, as it grew, the deduction
acquired the new rationale of encouraging homeownership and nestled
itself among other similarly purposed federal policies, such as the G.I.
Bill of Rights and Federal Housing Administration regulations. As
Professor Ventry states, in the 1950s, "analysts were already observing
that tax subsidies like the [mortgage interest deduction] were in line
with, if not specifically designed for, encouragement of homeownership
and consonant with the subsidy objective. 98 Though the drafters of the
Revenue Act of 1913 may not have had mortgages in mind for the
interest deduction, in the years following World War 11 the popularly
dubbed mortgage interest deduction fit naturally into a system of federal
policies designed to encourage homeownership.

92. Id.
at 647.
93. Id.
94. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS 284
(1983), availableat http://www.cbo.gov/publication/15250.
95. See generally KAHN, supra note 29, at110-16.
96. See, e.g., McNutt-Boyce Co. v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 462, 465-66 (1962) (holding that
business interest may be deducted under either the interest deduction or the general business
expense deduction).
97. See generally KAHN, supra note 29, at 110-16.
98. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax
Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 252 (2010) (internal citations
omitted); see also Andrea Ryan et al., A BriefPostwar History of U.S. Consumer Finance, 85 BUS.
HIST. REV. 461, 494 (2011).
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A Deduction Too Far: Credit Cards and Consumer Interest
Deductions, 1970-1986

In the early post-war period non-mortgage consumer credit was
also on the rise. As Professor Ryan and her coauthors observe:
After the war, government policies and initiatives fostered new
highway construction, federally insured home mortgages, and liberal
land-use planning. New roads and new suburbs created a commuter
culture that drove demand for automobiles. New houses required
furniture and appliances. Furthermore, after the war, and coming off
of savings rates as high as 26 percent, people were ready to begin
spending again. Between 1941 and 1961, annual consumer spending
for housing and cars more than tripled, from $718 to $2,513 per
household in constant dollars. To buy these goods, many households
relied on credit. By 1949, 49 percent of new cars, 54 percent of used
cars, 54 percent of refrigerators, and 46 percent of televisions were
being sold on credit. 99
Professor Lendol Calder describes the 1950s as the consumer credit
market's "lively adolescence," arguing that "[i]n this period, a number of
trends (such as the Baby Boom, suburbanization, and the entry of more
women into the work force) combined to make more consumers more
'0 °
willing than ever before to use credit for household consumption."'
The largest portion of the personal debt growth in the 1950s and 1960s
01
came from automobile loans, though retail and distributor credit cards
were also on the rise. 102Bank-style credit cards0 3 would also emerge in
the mid-i 960s with the rise of Master Charge and Bank Americard (later
MasterCard and Visa, respectively). 104 But, despite its rapid rise, in the
1950s and 60s, consumer credit did not reach the stunning growth rate or
high levels of outstanding debt of mortgage debt, and deductions of
99.
100.

Ryan et al., supra note 98, at 468-69.
Calder, supra note 59, at 24; see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS.,

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PRACTICES OF THE CONSUMER CREDIT INDUSTRY IN SOLICITING AND
EXTENDING CREDIT AND THEIR EFFECTS ON CONSUMER DEBT AND INSOLVENCY 4-5 (2006),

availableat http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/bankruptcy/bankruptcybillstudy2
00606.pdf.
101. Retail and distributer credit cards are those issued by someone whose primary business is
the sale of other goods or services and which can only be used to purchase the issuer's goods or
services. Thomas A. Durkin, Credit Cards: Use and Consumer Attitudes, 1970-2000, FED.
RESERVE BULLETIN 623,624 (Sept. 2000).

102. MYERS, supra note 58, at 388.
103. Bank-style credit cards, also referred to as universal cards, are those issued by a third
party financial institution, generally a bank or savings and loan, and may be used to make purchases
with a wide variety of vendors. See Durkin, supranote 101, at 624.
104. See generally LEWIS MANDELL, THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY 28-32 (1990).
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consumer credit interest did not appear to have a major effect on the tax
code.'0 5
By 1970, the consumer credit landscape was changing as a result of
the new breakneck growth of universal credit cards. In the late 1960s,
Master Charge and Bank Americard engaged in an enormous campaign
of mass mailing unsolicited credit cards to potential customers. 0 6 As a
result, these two dominant credit providers had put their cards into the
wallets of forty-four million Americans, thus establishing a large base of
cardholders.10 7 Moreover, this base would expand throughout the 1970s
as the number of universal credit cards in circulation more than doubled
and charge volume on these cards increased by fourteen hundred
percent. 10 8 Bank style credit cards were 7.3% of the credit card market
in 1967, but grew at an average rate of 28.7% per year, reaching a share
of 38.4% of the market in 1977.109

Technological innovations

throughout the 1970s-such as normalized credit scoring with FICO,
automated clearing house debits, automated teller machines, and point of
sale systems for electronic payment processing-accelerated the credit
card explosion by allowing debt issuers to more easily record and
process loans and by making credit cards an even more convenient
choice for consumers.11 0 Government deregulation also contributed to
growth of the consumer credit market as states raced to have the most
permissive credit terms to attract national lenders."'
Crucially, the rise of bank-style credit cards coincided with the
rapid growth of revolving credit in the United States during the 1970s
and early 1980s.112 Revolving credit-credit lines that are extended
indefinitely without a set repayment schedule or fixed numbers of
payments-allowed consumers to carry tremendous debt burdens and
make only interest payments." 3
These interest payments were

105. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 100, at 5.
106. MANDELL, supra note 104, at 33-37.
107.
Ryan et al., supra note 98, at 474.
108.
MANDELL, supra note 104, at 34.
109. Gillian Garcia, Credit Cards: An InterdisciplinarySurvey, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 327, 327
(1980).
110. Ryan et al., supra note 98, at 465.
111.
Id. at 489.
112. Durkin, supra note 101, at 624; see also Dean M. Maki, The Growth of Consumer Credit
and the Household Debt Service Burden, in THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT
43, 45 (Thomas A. Durkin & Michael E. Staten eds., 2002); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE
SYS., supra note 128, at 5.
113. Durkin, supra note 128, at 624-25 (Sept. 2000); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., supra note 100, at 4-5.
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114
substantial as interest rates on credit card were often 18% of principle.
And, as with business interest and mortgage interest, which were also
continuing to grow at this time, consumer credit interest was fully
deductible under the interest deduction."15 Just as residential mortgage
holders had embraced the interest deduction previously, credit card
debtors quickly learned that they could afford to maintain massive debts
with credit card companies if they could deduct their interest payments
from their taxable income."l 6 The role of the interest deduction in the
American market was once again expanding past its original purpose.
Business interest deductions are a natural and necessary part of an
income tax." l7 Mortgage interest deductions may be defended, at least
rhetorically, as a measure to encourage homeownership." l 8 But when
the federal government started subsidizing credit card companies by
forgoing large amounts of revenue to this new use of the interest
deduction, something had gone terribly wrong. Congress could not
approve of this new face for an old tax provision. More to the point, in
the late 1970s and early 1980s interest deductions from Americans'
mounting revolving debt burdens and their growing mortgage debts were
starting to seriously impede the income tax's ability to produce
revenue. 119 By the early 1980s, tax reformers 20were calling for
corrections to this and other corruptions of the Code. 1

E.

The Reckoning: The Interest Deduction and the Tax Reform Act of
1986

In 1970, taxpayers used the interest deduction to deduct 3.78% of
their adjusted gross income. 12 1 In 1975 and 1980, this number increased
to 4.1% and 5.65%, respectively. 2 2 By 1985, it had ballooned to 7.81%
114. 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 13 (2002); R.
Stephen Parker et al., The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and its Effect on Credit Card Usage by
Consumers, 15 J. OF ECON. & FIN. 147, 147 (1991).
115. See Ryan et al, supra note 98, at 493.
116. Id.
117. See TODER, supra note 38, at 1.
118. KAHN, supranote29, at 113-14.
119. Susan E. Woodward & John C. Weicher, Goring the Wrong Ox: A Defense of the
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 301, 301 (1989).
120. See Michael J. Graetz, The Truth About Tax Reform, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 617, 618-20
(1988); Joseph A. Pechman, Tax Reform: Theory and Practice, I J. ECON. PERSP. 11, 16-17 (1987).
121. Selected HistoricalData: Individual Income Tax Returns: Select Income and Tax Items
for Selected Tax Years, 1970-1980, 9 IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 4, 137 (Spring 1990),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/90rpsprbul.pdf [hereinafter, STATISTICS OF INCOME
BULLETIN, 1970-1980].
122. Id.
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as the outmoded and burgeoning interest deduction threatened to
seriously erode the tax base.' 23 And it was not alone. Tax credits for
campaign contributions, coal royalties, and exploration for minerals and
oil, as well as deductions for state taxes, medical expenses, adoption
costs, and other- contributed to creating an increasingly porous tax base
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 12 4 Congress employed high rates to
collect revenue from this "swiss-cheese" base, 25 but the government's
take from the income tax was increasingly falling behind spending. 26
'
In 1983, the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") submitted its
annual Report to the Senate and House Committees on Budget.' 27 This
report spoke in stark terms of the government's growing budget deficit
and identified insufficient revenues as part of the cause. 128 The report
indicated that revenue shortfalls could not be made up with simple rate
adjustments, but instead suggested many large-scale revenue increasing
strategies, several of which included limiting or eliminating the general
interest deduction. 129 By 1984, President Reagan was ready to make
comprehensive tax reform a legislative centerpiece for his second
term. 130 In his State of the Union address, Reagan observed the need for
broad tax reform, saying "[t]o talk of meeting the present situation by
increasing taxes is a Band-Aid solution which does nothing to cure an
illness that's been coming on for half a century.... There's a better
way."' 131 He continued, "[l]et us go forward with [a] historic reform for
fairness, simplicity, and incentives for growth.... And I believe such a
plan could... make the tax base broader, so personal tax rates could
come down, not go up.' ' 132 Though perhaps a bit reluctantly, Congress

generally heeded this call and worked to enact comprehensive tax reform
based on eliminating
special tax expenditures, broadening the base, and
33
lowering tax rates.

123. Id.
124.
Pechman, supra note 120, at 14.
125. Ventry, Jr., supra note 98, at 253.
126.
Richard A. Musgrave, Short of Euphoria, I J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 59 (1987).
127. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supranote 94.
128. Id. at 15-17.
129. Id. at 231.
130. Pechman, supra note 120, at 16.
131.
Ronald Reagan, Pres. of the United States of America, 1981-19898, Address before a
Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 25, 1984), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=40205.
132. Id.
133. See JEFFREY BIRNBAUM & ALAN MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH (1988).
Birnbaum and Murray offer a brilliant account of the political sausage making that embroiled
Congress from 1984 to 1986 as they worked to chum out the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Id.
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Where would reform put the interest deduction? One possibility
may have been to leave the deduction untouched, but its erosion of the
tax base was a real problem that could not go unaddressed. 134 The CBO
suggested capping the amount of interest a taxpayer could deduct,
without regard to the source of the interest.1 35 The Treasury Department
proposed indexing certain interest payments to the inflation rate and
creating a fractional exclusion rate that would allow taxpayers to only
deduct interest based on that index.1 36 And some commentators
suggested simply eliminating the deduction altogether.' 37 But the
interest deduction had powerful friends, especially for those using it to
deduct mortgage interest. 138 Homebuilders, homeowners, and realtors
vociferously protested against the possibility of Americans losing their
right to deduct home mortgage interest and threatened dire political
consequences to reformers who disrupted this deduction. 139 President
Reagan was quick to feel the political winds, and within months of
calling for fundamental tax reform he guaranteed protection for the
home mortgage portion of the interest deduction. 140 In May 1984,
President Reagan addressed the National Association of Realtors:
At that time, I was trying to emphasize that the Treasury Department's
study of ways to simplify and reform the tax code, which I consider a
real priority, is supposed to look at every aspect of the tax structure.
However, in saying that, I also stressed that I strongly agreed with the
home mortgage interest deduction, which is so vital to millions of
hard-working Americans. And in case there's still any doubt, I want
you to know we will preserve that part of the American dream. 141
In the next two years, Congress would pass and President Reagan
would sign the Tax Reform Act of 1986,142 the most significant and
STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, 1970-1980, supra note 121, at 137.
135. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 94, at 284.
136. 2 OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 193 (1984), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Pages/taxreform-index.aspx.
137. See generally Pechman, supra note 120, at 21-22.
138. Charles E. McLure & George R. Zodrow, Treasury / and the Tax Reform Act of 1986:
The Economics and Politics of Tax Reform, 1J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 45-46 (1987).
139. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 133, at 57; McLure & Zodrow, supra note 138, at 4546.
140. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 133, at 57; McLure & Zodrow, supra note 138, at 4546.
141. Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Midyear Meeting of the National Association of Realtors,
available
at
in
1984
PUBLIC
PAPERS
675,
678
(1984),
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/51084d.htm (emphasis added).
142. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat 2085 (1986).

134.
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comprehensive tax reform act since the income tax was enacted. 143 The
story of the interest deduction in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is the story
of reconciling an outdated, overly broad tax provision with three distinct
groups that had come to rely on it over time. The first group, those who
deducted business interest and whose use fit with a theoretically correct
understanding of the income tax, were the originally intended
beneficiaries when the provision was passed in 1913.1 44 But by 1986,
the interest deduction was no longer for this group, as it had been long
determined that even if there were no interest deduction in the tax code,
businesses could still deduct their interest under the general business
expense deduction. 145 The second group, individuals who deducted
mortgage interest for their owner-occupied homes, were an unforeseen
group when the provision was enacted, but their use of the deduction
was quickly approved under the rationale of encouraging
homeownership. 146 The third group, holders of unsecured consumer
debt, especially credit card debt, pushed the once minor deduction too
far. 4 7 In its final judgment, Congress blessed the second group and
cursed the third. Under Section 511 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the
deduction of interest on unsecured consumer debt was phased out over
several years and then completely eliminated, but the deduction of
interest on home mortgages and other loans secured
on the home, such
48
as home equity loans, continued to be allowed. 1
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is important to the story of the interest
deduction because it provides a knowable, observable, and measurable
turning point in the life of the deduction. In the years prior to the Act,
the interest deduction likely affected American mortgage consumption
patterns. But, the early interest deduction was just one of a tangle of
considerations that influenced the mortgage market and affected
borrowers' debt consumption patterns. Moreover, since the interest
deduction preceded the rise of the widespread American mortgage
market, scholars have never been able to compare a market without the
deduction to one with it, or observe the effects of introducing the
deduction as a new variable to the market. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
143.

Pechman, supra note 120, at 1I.

144.

See TODER, supra note 38, at 1.

145. McNutt-Boyce Co. v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 462, 465-66 (1962); see also Ungerman, Jr. v.
Comm'r, 89 T.C. 1131, 1136 (1987).
146. See generally KAHN, supra note 29, at 110-16.
147. See IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN (Spring 1990 and 1996), available at:
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-SOI-Bulletins (demonstrating the erosion of the tax base due
to the interest deduction.).
148. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat 2085 (1986).
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is a turning point because it refined and entrenched the interest
deduction. The Act refined the deduction by eliminating its application
to consumer interest and confirmed it as a tool to encourage
homeownership and mortgage consumption. The Act entrenched the
deduction as it promised-both implicitly and explicitly-that the new
mortgage interest deduction would survive into the future and that
homeowners could rely on it when making mortgage consumption
decisions. These changes combined to make the Act an important
turning point in the life of the interest deduction and one that, if properly
observed, can offer insights into the larger role of the mortgage interest
deduction in the mortgage market.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 had far reaching effects. 149 One of
the most straightforward was to stem the interest deduction's erosion of
the tax base. 150 As the prohibition against deducting consumer credit
interest phased in, the amount of adjusted gross income lost to the
interest deduction dropped, eventually stabilizing near 5%. Table I
shows the interest deduction's rise and decline from 1970 to 2000:
Table 1: Amount of Interest Deduction as a Percent of Adjusted
Gross Income 151

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

3.78%

4.1%

5.65%

7.81%

6.12%

5.13%

5.07%

Pinning down the other economic effects of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 may be somewhat more challenging. The change to the interest
deduction was bound to have an impact on the American mortgage
markets. 152 But this change was indirect and tracking its effects requires
more than just a cursory glance at the market. The next section is
149. Pechman, supra note 120, at 17-19.
150. Id. at 18.
151. I.R.S, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN (Spring 1990, 1996, and 2006), available at:
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-SOI-Bulletins.
152. Dennis S. Ortiz, Historical Federalist Perspective on the Home Mortgage Interest
Deductionfor FederalIncome Tax, 8 J. Bus. ECON. RES. 97, 98 (2010) (observing that the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, "although not directly impacting the [home mortgage interest] deduction, by
instituting a phase-out of the itemized deduction for consumer interest, had an important effect on
the use of mortgage interest").
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devoted to an in-depth analysis of the effects the Tax Reform Act of
1986 may have had on the American mortgage market.

III. ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN MORTGAGE MARKET AND THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986
A.

A Few Words on Methodology, Sources, and Causation

This section offers a very simple before-and-after comparative
analysis of the effects the Tax Reform Act of 1986's (hereinafter "the
Act") refinement and entrenchment of the mortgage interest deduction
may have had on the American mortgage market. In the pages
following, this article considers many pieces of data taken from several
sources that show the movement and trends of different aspects of the
American mortgage market. To eliminate distortive effects of inflation
and prevent errors from continually converting actual dollars into
constant dollars, the data considered is generally indexed to commonly
measured values in the United States, such as Gross Domestic Product
("GDP") and housing value.
This analysis will focus on two potential turning points for when
the changes to the mortgage interest deduction may have altered
mortgage debt consumption patterns. First, 1984 is highlighted as the
year when President Reagan promised that the mortgage interest
deduction would be preserved in the new tax system and assured its
continuation in the future, coinciding with the entrenchment of the
deduction. Second, 1987 is highlighted as the first year that the Act
went into effect, and effectively refining the deduction. On each time
series graph in this section there are two vertical lines, one at 1984 and
one at 1987, representing these two possible turning points in mortgage
debt consumption patterns.
There have been several articles analyzing the effects of the Act on
the American housing and mortgage market using sophisticated
econometric tools. Examples include Poterba (1992),153 Follain and
Dunsky (1997),154 and Hendershott and Pryce (2006), 15' each of which

develop econometric models to account for specific aspects of the
mortgage interest deduction's effects on the market. This article is
153.

James M. Poterba, Taxation and Housing: Old Questions, New Answers, 82 AM. ECON.

REV. 237 (1992).

154. James R. Follain & Robert M. Dunksy, The Demandfor Mortgage Debt and the Income
Tax, 8 J. HOUSING RES. 155 (1997).
155. Patric H. Hendershott & Gwilym Pryce, The Sensitivity of Homeowner Leverage to the
Deductibilityof Home Mortgage Interest, 60 J. URB. ECON. 50 (2006).
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purposely intended to have a much simpler, more intuitive examination
of the historical data without trying to impose a model or regression on
the numbers. Therefore, while future efforts may develop econometric
models based on the work here, this article intentionally does not include
such devices.
The data in this section comes from several different sources. The
usual suspects are well represented: the Federal Reserve Board provides
statistics of the flow of wealth and debt, 56 the Bureau of the Census
tracks various homeownership statistics, 57 the General Accounting
Office offers a thorough study of home equity debt,158 and the Bureau of
Economic Analysis publishes estimates of historic GDP. But these
sources have their holes. For example, the Census Bureau's American
Housing Survey contains a wealth of information on trends in the
housing and mortgage markets, but the Survey only started in 1985 and
its data is not statistically comparable to the data of its forerunner, the
Annual Housing Survey. 159 To shore up these holes, this analysis turns
to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics ("PSID"). 160 The PSID is an
on-going, longitudinal panel survey on American household
socioeconomic dynamics run by faculty of the Institute for Social
Research at the University of Michigan.' 61 The PSID is free to access,
well organized, reliable, and forms the data cornerstone of Hilber and
Turner's recent analysis. 62 As the PSID contains valuable household
mortgage data from 1968 to 2009 (though admittedly with a few holes as
well), it provides the perfect supplement to other, less congruous, data
156.

BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., Flow of Funds Accounts of the United

States. Flows and Outstandings First Quarter2012, in FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE 7
(June 7, 2012), available at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zi/current/zl.pdf [hereinafter Flow of
Funds Accounts].
157. American Housing Survey for the United States 3-15 (1985-2009), BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, http://www.census.gov/housing/ahs/data/national.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
158. National Economic Accounts: CurrentDollar and "Real" GDP, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/nationa/index.htm#gdp (last visited Mar. 3, 2013) [hereinafter
CurrentDollarand "Real " GDP].
159. See Annual Housing Survey for the United States and Regions 1973-1983, BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, http://www.census.gov/housing/ahs/publications/hl50.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).

A warning note reads, "In 1984, the Annual Housing Survey was changed to the American Housing
Survey. Cautionary note: The national sample underwent a redesign in 1985 based on data from the
1980 decennial census, therefore data from 1973-1983 are not comparable with data from 19852009." Id.
160.
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics -PSID - is the longest running longitudinal
survey
in
the
world,
PANEL
household
OF
INCOME
DYNAMICS,
STUDY

http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Panel Study of Income
Dynamics].
161. Id.
162. Hilber & Turner, supra note 20 at 19.
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sources.
What the data may show is a correlation between the Act and
substantial changes in the mortgage market. But dating back at least as
far as David Hume, it has been well understood that showing correlation
does not prove causation."' Moreover, the mortgage market is highly
complex.'1 64 Each mortgage borrower must consider numerous different
factors when deciding whether to take out a mortgage and what amount
to borrow. 165 And the American mortgage market as a whole is made of
millions of different borrowers working through these numerous
166
considerations individually and often arriving at different outcomes.
The tax treatment of mortgage debt is just one of manifold factors in the
decision calculus, and for many borrowers it may be insignificant. It
remains a possibility that the Act had no impact on the mortgage market
at all and that any changes in the mortgage market that correlate with the
Act are entirely coincidental.
However, some qualitative evidence may serve to better link
changes in the mortgage market to the changes to the interest deduction.
The fact is that the tax benefits of mortgages were well known and well
circulated as a selling point of mortgages at the time of the Act. Lenders
were aggressively advertising the tax benefits of mortgage loans. 67 For
instance, in 1987, Chase Manhattan Bank sent a mass mailing to New
York residents promoting its line of home equity loans and advertising
their tax benefits. 168 Moreover, the media also advertised the effects of
the Act to the public by running articles describing financial strategies
based around tax favored mortgages, 169 hosting roundtables for tax
experts to offer their mortgage advice and services,1 70 and offering

163.

KEVIN D. HOOVER, CAUSALITY IN MACROECONOMICS 5 (2001).

164.
165.

Evolution Of The U.S. Housing FinanceSystem, supra note 66, at 1.
Robert Van Order, The U.S. Mortgage Market: A Model of Duelling Charters, II J. OF

HOUSING RES. 233, 239-40 (2000).

166. Evolution Of The U.S. Housing FinanceSystem,supra note 66, at 11-18.
167. Ronald H. Silverman, Toward Curing PredatoryLending, 122 BANKING L. J. 483, 518
(2005).
168. Robert A. Bennett, Consumer Spending: Fears and Reassurances; the Pitfalls of a
Second Mortgage, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1987, at 45; see also Wendy Swallow, Equity Loan
Competition Intensifies; Area Lenders Offering New Rates and Incentives to Borrowers,
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 14, 1987, at El (describing a boom in home equity loans and arguing,
"The reason for the boom, lenders said, is the series of tax changes adopted by Congress last fall").
169. John Crudele, New Strategies for Family Finances; Home Refinancing: Advantages,
Even Today, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1987, at 44; see also Barbara Bradley, If You're Renting, There
Are New Reasons to Buy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 30, 1987, at 18.
170. David E. Rosenbaum & Jan M. Rosen, A New Era in American Tax Policy; Roundtable:
How the Tax will Affect Individuals,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1987, at 10.
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question-and-answer forums for their readers. 171 Based on this, scholars
at the time predicted the Act would have some impact on the mortgage
market. For instance, Manchester and Poterba observed in 1988,
"restrictions on the tax-deductibility of non-mortgage interest payments
contained in the 1986 Tax Reform Act are likely to spur continued
growth of second mortgage borrowing." 172 This evidence suggests that
mortgage borrowing and its tax advantages with the mortgage interest
deduction were tightly linked in the American consciousness at the time
of the Act.
B.

Trends in the Mortgage Market Relative to the Tax Reform Act of
1986

Comparing total mortgage debt to GDP over time provides a broad view of the
mortgage market from which to begin this analysis. Figure 3 shows this
measure:
173
Figure 3: Total Outstanding Mortgage Debt as a Percent of GDP
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Benny L. Kass, Homeowners: Learn About Tax Breaks, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 28,

1987, at F5.
172. Joyce M. Manchester & James M. Poterba, Second Mortgages and Household Saving, 19
REG'L SCIENCE AND URB. ECON. 325, 325-26 (1989); see also Glenn B. Canner et al., Recent
Developments in Home Equity Lending, 84 FED. RESERVE BULLETIN 241, 242 (Apr. 1998).
173.
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 408 (2012),

available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ERP_2012_Complete.pdf;
GDP data: Current Dollarand "Real" GDP,supra note 158.
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The trend of America's mortgage debt relative to GDP for the past
fifty years has been marked with alternating periods of stability and
growth, with substantial decline occurring only in the years following
the start of the mortgage crisis in 2008.114 As Figure 3 demonstrates,
throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s, the mortgage debt held steady
at around 30% of GDP, increasing modestly and stabilizing just below
35% in the late 1970s and early 1980s.175 Starting in 1984, and
continuing throughout the rest of the 1980s and into the 1990s, this
proportion grew noticeably, until it plateaued just above 45%. 176 The
growth of the late 1980s gave way to stability in the 1990s, followed by
greatly exaggerated growth in the early 2000s.177 This is a pattern that
will be repeated, with varying degrees of definition, in much of the data.
The data tends to show that 1984 is a turning point that coincides
with the start of dramatic growth in the mortgage market.1 78 Hereinafter
this period of growth between 1984 and 1991 shall be referred to as the
"1980s mortgage debt growth." A period comparison may help to
capture a sense of this growth. From 1977 to 1984, mortgage debt to
GDP increased a total of 2.87 percentage points at an average rate of
0.41 percentage points per year, while from 1984 to 1991 the ratio
increased a total of 12.25 percentage points at an average rate of 1.75
percentage points per year. 179 Again, this does not prove that the tax
reform efforts caused this shift in the mortgage market, however, there is
enough information present to observe that President Reagan's promise
to preserve the mortgage interest deduction coincided with a marked
increase in mortgage debt consumption as a proportion of GDP.
How was this increasing mortgage debt divided among
homeowners? Figure 4 shows the percent of homeowners with at least
one mortgage outstanding:

174.
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 173, at 408; GDP data: Current
Dollar and "Real" GDP, supra note 158.
175.
Current Dollar and "Real" GDP, supra note 158.
176. Id.
177.
Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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1 80
Figure 4: Percent of Homeowners with at Least One Mortgage
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Clearly, 1984 and 1987 provide no substantial turning point in this
data. The pattern here differs from the pattern of mortgage debt to GDP
above as the proportion of homeowners with at least one mortgage holds
steady throughout the 1980s, makes a substantial dip in the early 1990s,
and then climbs sharply upwards in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 8 '
This data tends to show that the 1980s mortgage debt growth was not
matched by an increase in the number of people holding mortgage
debt.1 82 Moreover, there was not a surge of new homeownership during
83
this period that may disrupt the proportions shown in this data.'
Instead, the homeownership rate held steady, staying between 63.49% in
1985 and 64.66% in 1993.184 Whatever effect the Act had on the
increase of mortgage debt generally, it did not cause a general rush of
entrants into the mortgage market.
180.

Panel Study of Income Dynamics, supra note 160.

181.
182.

Id.
Id.

183.

Id.

184.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES 3-15

(1985, 1993), available at: http://www.census.gov/housing/ahs/data/national.html; see also Glaeser,
Edward L. & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, in 17 TAX
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 37, 39-40 (James M. Poterba, ed. 2003).
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This leads to an important observation: as mortgage debt increased
while the homeownership rate and proportion of homeowners with
mortgages held steady, the amount of debt per mortgage holder
increased. In other words, mortgage debt became more concentrated in
the hands of those who participated in the mortgage market, rather than
spread amongst even more participants. This may suggest either that
new entrants who were joining the mortgage market were taking out
increasing amounts of first mortgage debt to purchase their homes, or
existing mortgage holders were taking out more debt (or maintaining
more existing debt) against their homes. As the following data show,
both seem to be true.
First, new homeowners were borrowing increasing amounts with
their first mortgages in the late 19 80s. The standard method of
determining the amount of mortgage debt a homeowner acquires with a
first mortgage is the "loan-to-value" metric, which measures the first
mortgage debt as a percent of the purchased home's value.'1 85 Figure 5
shows this measure for years 1985 to 2009.

185. See e.g., Daniel E. Feder, Should Loan-to-Value Ratio Restrictions be Reimposed on
National Banks' Real Estate Lending Activities?, 6 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 341, 341-44 (1987);
Kasey Curtis, The Burst Bubble: Revisiting ForeclosureLaw in Light of the Collapse of the Housing
Industry, 36 WESTERN ST. U. L. REV. 119, 126-29 (2008).
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Figure 5: Median Current Value of New First Mortgage as a
Percent of Home Value
86
(Commonly referred to as median "loan-to-value" measure)1
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This data show a sharp upward trend throughout the 1980s and early
1990s.1 87 The measure moves from below 50% to over 60% from 1985
to 1993, before leveling out between 55% and 60% in the rest of the
1990s and early 2000s. 88 This corresponds to the pattern seen in the
mortgage to GDP data with the 1980s mortgage debt growth, followed
by a leveling off through the 1990s.1 89 Unfortunately, as lamented
above, the American Housing Survey, from which this data come, began
collecting data in 1985 and its results are not comparable with the
186.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES 3-15

(1985-2009), available at: http://www.census.gov/housing/ahs/data/national.html.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX POLICY: MANY FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO
THE

GROWTH

IN

HOME

EQUITY

FINANCING

IN THE

1980s

9

(1993),

available at

www.gao.gov/assets/220/217733.pdf (stating, "Our analysis of mortgage debt data and home values
from 1981through 1991 showed that, in 1991 dollars, the dollars outstanding for first mortgage debt
increased at a faster pace than home values").
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forerunning Annual Housing Survey.' 90 This lack of prior data prevents
observation of how the trend in the late 1980s may have differed from
what came before.'91 Regardless of when it started, this increase in first
mortgage value accounts for at least part of the 1980s mortgage debt
increase that coincided with and followed the Act.
Second, home equity debt' 92 was also on the rise in the 1980s, in
both dollar amounts and relative share of the consumer credit market. In
1981, there was $60 billion in home equity debt outstanding, making up
2.9% of all consumer credit; in 1986 there was $221 billion outstanding,
making up 8.0% of all consumer credit; and in 1991 there was $357
billion outstanding, making up 9.8% of all consumer credit.' 93 Of this
increase, the highest growth rates-often above 100% increases over
94
prior years-occurred in the early 1980s, before the advent of the Act.'
These growth rates dropped off substantially in 1987 and slowed further
thereafter. 95
But these numbers may be misleading.
As the
Government Accounting Office explains, "[a]lthough the annual growth
rates were much higher prior to the tax code changes of 1986 and 1987,
these [tax] changes may have further increased the use of such financing
because the growth rate probably would have been lower in their
absence."'196 In addition to growth rates it is also important to consider
total levels of debt in the market. Figure 6 shows the number of lines of
home equity credit added by year of line origination.

190. See Panel Study of Income Dynamics, supra note 160.
191. Some research indicates that the upward trend may have started as early as 1981. See
Jonathan Skinner, Housing and Saving in the United States, in HOUSING MARKETS IN THE U.S. AND
JAPAN, 191, 194-95 (Yukio Noguchi and James Poterba eds., 1991) (but arguing also, "[s]ome part
of the increase was caused by the relatively tax-favored status of housing mortgages following the
Tax Reform Act of 1986").
192. The terms "home equity loan" and "second mortgage" are synonyms and will be used
here interchangeably. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 189, at 20.
193. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 189, at 12-14.
194. Id. at 8.
195. Id.

196.

Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol28/iss1/2

32

Frederick: Reconciling Intentions with Outcomes: A Critical Examination of t

2013]

RECONCILING INTENTIONS WITH OUTCOMES

Figure 6: Number of Single Family Homes (in thousands) with a
New Outstanding
Home Equity Line of Credit, by Year of Line
197
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Though home equity lending may have higher growth rates in the
early 1980s, it reached astoundingly high levels later in the decade. The
study from which this data is collected confirms, "[m]ost outstanding
home equity lines of credit were originated after 1987." 198 And as most
home equity debt was carried for several years, each new line of home
equity credit added to the growing total home equity debt.
Also, unlike the distribution of general mortgage debt considered
above in Figure 4, the growth of home equity debt also may have
become more widespread following the Act. Figure 6 shows this
diffusion of second mortgages among homeowners who already have at
least one mortgage.

197.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Home Equity Lines of Credit: A Look at the People Who Ob-

tain
Them,
in
STATISTICAL
BRIEF
(June
1995),
available
at
www.census.gov/apsd/www/statbrief/sb95- 15.pdf.
198. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Home Equity Lines of Credit: A Look at People who Obtain
Them, in STATISTICAL BRIEF (June 1995); see also Manchester & Poterba, supra note 172, at 32526.
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Figure 7: Percent of First Mortgage Holders that have a Second
Mortgage 99
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As the data show, distribution of second mortgages among
homeowners with first mortgages holds steady just above 10% starting
in 1983, but then surges upwards in the late 1980s, topping out just
above 14% in 1992.200 It seems 1987 may be a turning point in this
growth. From 1983 to 1987 this measure of mortgage distribution grew
by a total of 0.12 percentage points, while from 1987 to 1992 this
measure surged by 3.75 percentage points at an average rate of 0.75
percentage points per year and added nearly 35% additional second
mortgage holders to the market.2 ' Importantly, this data does not show
a true spreading of the mortgage market to include more participants. 202
Instead, this increase only represents a surge of new debt for
homeowners who already hold debt and were simply taking out more
debt.20 3 The data in Figure 6 also keeps with the general pattern of
mortgage debt as the surge generally coincides with the 1980s mortgage
debt growth, and the fall off in the period 1993 to 1999 matches the

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

PanelStudy of Income Dynamics, supra note 160.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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75

leveling off of the mortgage
debt to GDP in the 1990s, with growth
4
2000s.20
the
in
again
With new homeowners taking out increasingly high loan-to-value
first mortgages and existing homeowners increasingly borrowing more
in home equity debt, the 1980s mortgage debt growth is marked by
homeowners generally raising their total debt leverage against their
home values. Figure 8 demonstrates this point:
Figure 8:5Remaining Principle of all Mortgages as a Percent of
20
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This PSID dataset is similar to the loan-to-value measure from the
American Housing Survey, except that it tracks the remaining principle
20 6
of all mortgages (not just first mortgages) relative to housing value.
The data show that homeowners were indeed increasingly leveraged
against their home values throughout the 1980s mortgage growth, but
also that neither 1984 nor 1987 appear as a turning point in this trend. 207
Rather this trend seems to start closer to 198 1.208 While changes to the
interest deduction could not have caused this increased leveraging, the

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Skinner, supra note 191, at 194.
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Act may have maintained, or even accelerated, this increasing debt
leverage through the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s. 20 9 How would

the Act maintain or accelerate pre-existing growth in the mortgage
market?
The best answer seems to be that the Act sharply altered consumer
2 10
choices between general consumer debt and home equity financing.
Professor Canner and his co-authors explain:
Although households have used home equity loans for many years,

their appeal for homeowners was heightened by the Tax Reform Act of
1986, which mandated the phaseout of federal income tax deductions
for interest paid on nonmortgage consumer debt. With this change in
tax law, mortgage debt (on which the interest remained tax deductible)
became more attractive to consumers for funding expenditures that
previously 21
were
financed through auto loans, credit cards, or personal
1
cash loans.
A simple calculation can show in real terms why home equity
financing was more attractive than general consumer credit financing.
In the following income computation, all variables, except for the type
of interest payment and their corresponding tax deductibility, have been
assumed away: gross income is held equal at $100,000, gross income is
equal to adjusted gross income, 212 there is no personal exemption, the
tax rate is flat at 28%, and only an itemized deduction for mortgage
interest paid is available. The following demonstrates the difference of
tax deductibility when considering financing type:

209.

Id. at 195; see also Jonathan Skinner & Daniel Feenberg, The Impact of the Tax Reform

Act of 1986 on PersonalSavings, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. WORKING PAPER SERIES 1, 4 (Feb.
1990), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w03257.

210.

See, e.g., Canner et al., supra note 172.

211.

Id. at 242; see also Todd Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of

Subprime Lending, 80 U. COL. L. REV 1, 6 (2009) (arguing "This change to the tax code made
mortgage debt more attractive than other forms of consumer debt, thereby increasing demand for
homeownership and refinancing mortgages, as well as amplifying incentives for homeowners to
borrow against the wealth in their homes through home equity loans or refinancing").
212.

This removes the above-the-line deductions available under IRC § 62(a).
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Consumer Credit Loan
Interest Payment Calculation
Gross Income
$100,000
Interest payment
-20,000
Remaining Pre-Tax Income$ 80,000

Home Equity Loan
Interest Payment Calculation
Gross Income
$100,000
Interest payment
- 20,000
Remaining Pre-Tax Income$ 80,000

Tax Calculations
Adjusted Gross Income
$100,000
Itemized Interest Deduction0
Taxable Income
100,000
Tax Rate
x
0.28
Income Tax Liability
28,000

Tax Calculations
Adjusted Gross Income
$100,000
Itemized Interest Deduction- 20 000
Taxable Income
80,000
Tax Rate
X 0.28
Income Tax Liability
22,400

Remaining Pre-Tax Income$ 80,000
Tax Burden
- 28,000
Net After-Tax Income
$ 52,000

Tax Burden

-

Net After-Tax Income

$ 57,600

Remaining Pre-Tax Income$ 80,000
22 400

As the calculation shows, the taxpayer who finances with a home
equity loan, and is thus able to deduct the interest payments, has
significant tax savings over the taxpayer who cannot deduct interest.
This saving endures, even when other complexities of the Code are
added back into the calculations.
Based on this, Americans had a strong incentive to abandon
standard consumer financing and substitute home equity debt.21 3 The
data suggests that in the years after the Act, consumers followed this
incentive. 214 Figure 9 compares the annual growth rates of mortgage
debt and consumer debt:

213. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: Simplicity, Equity, and Efficiency, 4
AKRON TAX J. 69, 77 (1987); Dean M. Maki, Household Debt and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 91
AM. ECON. REV. 305, 305-06 (2001); Parker et al., supra note 142, at 148.
214. Flow of Funds Accounts, supra note 156.
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Figure 9: Annual Mortgage Debt Growth and Consumer Debt
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Prior to 1986, except for possible outliers in 1980 and 1984,
consumer debt growth and mortgage debt growth trended strongly

together, typically growing within two percentage points of each
other.216 There is a turning point in 1986 or 1987,217 when consumer
debt growth drops off relative to mortgage debt growth and stays
consistently lower until 1993. Analysts have generally attributed this
rise of mortgage debt relative to consumer debt to the Act.2 18 For
instance, Maki observes, "[t]he data.., hint strongly that the change in
tax law may have induced households to substitute mortgage debt for
consumer debt. . . 219 Bartlett opines more directly that in response to
the Act, "households simply converted their household debt into
mortgage debt through home equity loans. 2 2 °
The trend of home equity debt growth relative to consumer debt is
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Maki, Household Debt, supra note 265, at 306 (arguing that "[q]uarterly data indicate
that consumer debt fell off sharply in the fourth quarter of 1986 when [the Tax Reform Act of 1986]
was signed into law, so even the 1986 falloff may be related to [the Tax Reform Act of 1986]").
218. See, e.g. id.; Bartlett, supra note 4.
219. Maki, Household Debt, supra note 265, at 306.
220. Bartlett, supra note 4, at 360
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again broadly consistent with the general trend of mortgage debt patterns
observed throughout this analysis: growth in the late 1980s, stability in
the 1990s, and fast growth in the early 2000s. In this case, mortgage
debt growth was consistently higher than consumer debt growth from
1986 to 1993, mortgage growth flattened off and consumer debt growth
resurged in the mid-1990s, and mortgage debt once again grew quickly,
noticeably faster than consumer debt growth, starting in 2001.221
This brings up an important final observation. While the Act may
account for maintaining, accelerating, or perhaps even causing the
mortgage debt growth of the 1980s, it is far less able to adequately
explain the leveling off of mortgage debt in the mid- 1990s and the return
to mortgage debt growth in the early 2000s. 222 Intervening causes,
beyond the scope of this article, likely account for these subsequent
shifts in the market. Therefore, whatever market-altering the Act had
was temporary. After an initial period, the benefits of the interest
deduction faded into the complex mix of considerations that consumers
must weigh as they decide on their mortgage debt consumption. The
mortgage interest deduction is important, but it became just another part
of the calculus.
IV. CONCLUSION
For as long as there has been an individual income tax in the
twentieth century there has been a deduction through which homeowners
could deduct mortgage interest. But early on, this deduction, which was
primarily used by businesses, had no discernible impact on the mortgage
market as average Americans were not subject to the income tax and
thus had no reason to take notice. Following World War I, the pattern
changed, and soon millions of Americans were paying mortgages, filing
tax returns, and deducting mortgage interest. But with the introduction
of the G.I. Bill of Rights, the Veterans Administration mortgage
insurance program, and the reinvigoration of Depression-era housing
initiatives, there were too many variables changing all at once to
determine exactly what effect the interest deduction had on the
expanding mortgage market. All that can be said with certainty is that
the deduction fit into the government's general system of encouraging
homeownership.
The growth of consumer debt during the 1970s further obscured the
picture. During this time the debt market landscape was muddled by
221.
222.

Flow of Funds Accounts, supra note 156.
See id.
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constant, rapid changes in consumer credit patterns, especially with the
rise of the bank-style credit card industry. In that period, the interest
deduction played a role in encouraging Americans to consume more debt
generally, but it is not clear that the deduction affected mortgage
consumption patterns specifically.
A moment of clarity for the interest deduction comes with the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. This Act refined and entrenched the mortgage
interest deduction.
The refinement preserved the incentive for
mortgage-based debt while casting off the incentive for all other
consumer debt types. The entrenchment fortified the mortgage interest
deduction as a sacred part of the tax code capable of surviving the
biggest change to tax laws since their inception and continuing into
posterity. This refinement and entrenchment created a simple message
that was well communicated to the country: Mortgage debt shall be the
only tax favored for Americans to borrow for years to come.
There is a strong case that the changes to the mortgage interest
deduction in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 correlates with substantial
increases in the amount of mortgage debt Americans consumed relative
to GDP and housing value. This growth can be traced back to increases
in both primary mortgage and home equity mortgage consumption, and
though the growth may have started before the proposal or passage of
the Act, there is reasonable evidence that the passage of the Act worked
to maintain or accelerate it, especially by making home equity debt more
attractive than standard consumer debt and encouraging consumer
debtors switch. The caveat to this growth was that the 1980s mortgage
debt growth resulted from a pattern of homeowners consuming more
mortgage debt, not more people using mortgage debt to become
homeowners. In concurrence with what many commentators have
already observed, the mortgage interest deduction simply does not seem
to affect homeownership rates.
Why would the changes to the mortgage interest deduction in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 correspond with an increase in mortgage
consumption but not an increase in homeownership rates? The simple
answer is that the refinement of the interest deduction into the mortgage
interest deduction was enough to cause consumers to switch their mode
of personal finance, but even the entrenchment of an already existing
deduction was insufficient to alter Americans' personal home buying
calculations enough to push them into homeownership. A more elegant
answer would be that though the mortgage market and the housing
market are closely related and have tremendous overlap, they are not
identical. The mortgage market and the housing market are distinct and
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the government is targeting the wrong one with tax incentives. If the
government wants to encourage homeownership, it should create an
incentive within the housing market. It is not enough to incentivize
consumption in a closely related, yet still distinct, market.
This article is not about the mortgage crisis of 2008, but it would be
remiss if it did not comment on such an important and closely related
topic. Pared down to its ultra-simplified core, the 2008 mortgage crisis
was the consequence of Americans accruing more residential mortgage
debt than they could sustain in the long term. 223 As the unaffordability
of this tremendous cumulative mortgage debt reached critical mass, the
nation faced a wave of underwater properties, defaults, foreclosures, and
an unprecedented loss of total marketable wealth in the United States.224
As this article has shown, the refinement and entrenchment of the
mortgage interest deduction in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 correlated
with a substantial increase in mortgage debt consumption. Is it possible
that the 1980s mortgage debt growth led directly to this unsustainable
level of mortgage debt consumption? In other words, did the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 and its changes to the mortgage interest deduction
cause the 2008 mortgage crisis?
Probably not, at least not directly. The refinement and
entrenchment of the mortgage interest deduction in the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 did coincide with large gains in the mortgage debt relative to
GDP and housing value. But whatever caused the 1980s mortgage debt
growth, the 1990s generally acted as an intervening period of stability
and relative moderation, before the breakneck growth of mortgage debt
in the early 2000S. 2 25 It is the stability of the 1990s that prevented the
debt growth of the 1980s from being a straight line upward into the debt
overgrowth and eventual meltdown of the 2000s. With such an
intervening stability it can be confidently understood that the Tax
Reform Act of 1980 did not directly cause the mortgage crisis of
2008.226 This is not to say that the mortgage interest deduction was not a
223.
Alan M. White, Deleveragingthe American Homeowner: The Failureof 2008 Voluntary
Mortgage ContractModifications, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2009).

224. The crisis was exacerbated by the fact that many of these unaffordable mortgages were
largely subprime-they were designed to be unaffordable and purposely marketed to people who
could not afford them-and packaged as mortgage backed securities, which made them extremely
hard to extricate, isolate, and write off. However the debt was structured, the central cause of the
crisis remains that Americans consumed more mortgage debt than it could afford. See generally
Sally Pittman, Arms but no Legs to Stand on: "Subprime"Solutions Plaguethe Subprime Mortgage
Crisis,40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1089 (2008).

225.

Refer to Figure 3, infra text accompanying note 222.

226.
EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33775, ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGES:
CAUSES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF TROUBLED MORTGAGE RESETS IN THE SU1PRIME AND ALT-
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contributing factor in the crisis. Most likely it was. In the perfect storm
of events that worked together to cause the mortgage crisis in 2008 the
mortgage interest deduction was certainly pushing in the wrong
direction, in favor of unsupportable mortgage debt. Considering this
push towards mortgage consumption that does not correspond with an
increase in homeownership, Congress should consider whether the
mortgage interest deduction is a tax provision worth preserving, or an
anachronism that's purpose is lost in its history.

A MARKETs, 3 (Oct. 8, 2008).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol28/iss1/2

42

